Scottish Common Sense Philosophy

Thomas Reid is credited with the development of an approach to philosophy that has identified as "common sense philosophy." To some degree, it is part of the basic orientation of most of the thinkers included in this website. It is a distaste for complex philosophic argumentation, as had been prevalent in medieval philosophy, for example. Reid was mostly triggered in this work by a reaction to Hume's publication of a Treatise on Human Nature, where he questions our ability to have a real knowledge of the world, as our knowledge is in the form of ideas. The intention here is not to delve deeply into this topic, but just to provide an introduction through a few key quotations. :

When I perceive a tree before me, my faculty of seeing gives me not only a notion or simple apprehension of the tree, but a belief of its existence, and of its figure, distance, and magnitude; and this judgment or belief is not got by comparing ideas, it is included in the very nature of the perception… Such original and natural judgments are therefore a part of that furniture which nature hath given to the human understanding. They are the inspiration of the Almighty, no less than our notions or simple apprehensions. They serve to direct us in the common affairs of life, where our reasoning faculty would leave us in the dark. They are a part of our constitution, and all the discoveries of our reason are grounded upon them. They make up what is called the common sense of mankind; and what is manifestly contrary to any of those first principles is what we call absurd... When a man suffers himself to be reasoned out of the principles of common sense, by metaphysical arguments, we may call this metaphysical lunacy; which differs from the other species of the distemper in this, that it is not continued, but intermittent: it is apt to seize the patient in solitary and speculative moments; but when he enters into society, Common Sense recovers her authority.[Reid, 1]

Reid's debt to his teacher, George Turnbull, is apparent, as can be seen from this statement by Turnbull:  "It is only such philosophers, who seeking the knowledge of human nature, not from experience, but from I know not what subtle theories of their own invention, depart from common language, and therefore are not understood by others, and sadly perplex and involve themselves."[2]

The Moral Sense

An early example of this "common sense" approach that predates Reid's formulation is Hutcheson's concept of a "moral sense." On matters of morality, he believes that we can avoid complex reasoning, and rely on innate instincts that are available to everyone:

The weakness of our Reason, and the avocations arising from the infirmity and necessities of our nature, are so great, that very few men could ever have formed those long deductions of reason... The Author of Nature has much better furnished us for a virtuous conduct, than our moralists seem to imagine, by almost as quick and powerful instructions, as we have for the preservation of our bodies. He has made virtue a lovely Form, to excite our pursuit of it; and has given us strong affections to be the springs of each virtuous action.[3]

Although he was the primary target of Reid's accusations of "metaphysical lunacy", on morals, Hume offers a farily balanced asessment:

There has been a controversy started of late concerning the general foundations of morals; whether they be derived from reason or from sentiment; whether we attain knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense. These arguments on each side (and many more might be produced) are so plausible, that I am apt to suspect they may, the one as well as the other, be solid and satisfactory, and that reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions. This final sentence depends on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species... But in order to pave the way for such a sentiment, and give a proper discernment of its object, it is often necessary, we find, that much reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated relations examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained.[4]

The Human Social Nature

All of our authors subscribe to the inherent social nature of the human species, Turnbull calling it the "Law of Society": "Men are not only lead to society by several strong affections and dispositions; but man is so framed for society, that private and public happiness and perfection exceedingly depend upon our uniting together in a proper manner, or under proper laws, and a right form of government, for promoting our common happiness, dignity and perfection.”[5]

Adam Ferguson has been recognized as a "proto-sociolgist" for the type of analysis of the human species that would later be consider formal sociology. In an example of  his more formal "sociological" analysis, Ferguson distinguishes between merely grouping and an organized species with designated functions, which is the human case:

Among the varieties of the animal kingdom, some are said to be associating or gregarious, others solitary... Of these, some are observed merely to herd or assemble, with little or no appearance of co operation, or distribution of tasks... Others are observed to combine their labours for a common purpose; to distribute their task, and assign to difierent members of the community, the parts which they are required to perform; such, among the quadrupeds is the beaver; and, among the insects where examples of this sort are most frequent, the ant, the wasp, the bee, and many others. These, in the translation of ah elegant title bestowed upon them by Aristotle may be termed the gregarious and political. Under this last designation, we are surely authorised by the fact to comprehend the species of man. Wherever there is a plurality of men, there is also a society; and, in society, there is a distribution of parts, and a co-operation of many, to some common purpose or end.[6]

The Common Good

The concept of the "common good" has a deep history in Western thought, developed by both classical and medieval thinkers, but it achieved a foundational or normative function in the sociopolitical thought of the Scottish Enlightenment, and it follows directly from Ferguson's sociological concepts in the previous section:

The highest point to which moral science conducts the mind of man, is that eminence of thought, from which he can view himself as but a part in the community of living creatures; by which he is in some measure let into the design of God, to combine all the parts together for the common benefit of all; and can state himself as a willing instrument for this purpose, in what depends on his own will; and as a conscious instrument, at the disposal of providence, in matters which are out of his power.[Ferguson, 7]

George Turnbull goes beyond the basic concept of the common good to a sense of fellowship that provides emotional satisfaction, and extends it to ultimate ends:

The notion of a public good, or of the universal happiness of our kind, is a complicated idea, which is not immediately apprehended so soon as one sees or feels, but requires some reflexion and a progress of the mind to form it… But nature has fitted the mind to form the idea of our kind, and of its general good; for every particular exercise of the mind in the benevolent social way, naturally tends to beget and establish such a prevalency of good humour, tenderness, and benevolence in the general temperature of the mind; as when it is formed, must naturally dispose it to seek for exercise and entertainment to itself in the most enlarged way; and thus the inclination to extend benevolence growing with every particular exertion of it, the idea of good to be pursued, will naturally expand itself, till it not merely comprehends our own kind, but takes in and embraces all beings in general, or the whole system of nature…[8]

Call to Action

Whether dealing with social or personal responsibility, our authors call for concrete actions beyond the acceptance of principles:  "mere kind affection without action, or slothful wishes will never make us happy. Our chief joy consists in the exercise of our more honourable powers; and when kind affections are tolerably lively they must be the spring of vigourous efforts to do good." [Hutcheson, 9]

Ferguson concurs in that this obligation to act in society also provides the sense of fulfillment that most human beings desire:

The happiness of man, when most distinguished, is not proportioned to his external possessions, but to his exertion and application of his faculties: It is not proportioned to his exemption from difficulty or danger, but to the magnanimity, courage, and fortitude, with which he acts. It is not proportioned to the benefits he receives, but to those he bestows, or rather to the candour and benevolence with which, as a person obliging or obliged, he is ready to embrace his fellow-creatures, and to acknowledge or reward their merits.[10]

[1]Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of the Human Mind (Dublin: L. White, 1786), Vol.1, 259-260.

[2] George Turnbull, Principles of Moral Philosophy (London: John Noon, 1740), 16.

[3] Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry Into the Original of our Ideas Of Beauty and Virtue (London: J. Darby et al, 1726), xiv-xv.

[4] David Hume "An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals " in the Philosophical Works of David Hume, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1854), Vol. 4, 230-233.

[5] George Turnbull, Principles of Moral Philosophy (London: John Noon, 1740), 174-175.

[6]Adam Ferguson, Principles of Moral and Political Science,18-21.

[7] Adam Ferguson, Principles of Moral and Political Science, Vol. 1, 313

[8] George Turnbull, Principles of Moral Philosophy (London: John Noon, 1740), 191.

[9] Francis Hutcheson, A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, 75.

[10] Adam Ferguson, Principles of Moral and Political Science, Vol. 1, 185-186.